EDITORIAL by unknown
YALE LAW JOURNAL
SUBSCRIPTION PRICE, $2.50 A YEAR. 
SINGLE COPIES, 85 CENT8
EDITORIAL BOARD.
C. HADLAi HULL, Chairman.
JOSEPH M. FORSYTH. KARL 
GOLDSMITH.
FRANK P. McEvoY. WILLIAM 
V. GRIFFIN.
GEO. S. MUNSON. RICHARD 
C. HUrNT.
G. ELTON PARKS. ADRIAN A. PIERSON.
G. S. VAN SCHAICK. 
HARRISON 'T. SHELDON.
FRANK KENNA, Business Manager.
Published monthly during the Academic year, by students 
of the Yale Law School
P. 0. Address, Box 893, Yale Station, New Haven, Conn.
subscriber wishes his copy of the JouRNAL discontinued at the expiration of his 
subscription,
notice to that eEfct should be sent; otherwise, it is assumed 
that a continuation of the subscription
is desired.
DAMAGES FOR DELAY IN TRANSMITTING MESSAGES.
In Lucas v. Western Union Telegraph Company decided in the
Iowa Court of Appeals and reported in iO9 N. W. Igi, the defend-
ant was sued to recover profits claimed to have been lost in a 
real
estate transaction because of defendant's negligence in failing 
to
deliver a telegram. Although the court does not hold directly that
such profits might be recovered, certainly its opinion permits 
of
such an inference. The question is not a new one and has been
decided frequently before, but unfortunately, the decisions are not
harmonious.
As to the amount of damages recoverable in general for the
breach of a contract, the rule is that the offending party shall be lia-
ble only for such damages as the parties may be supposed to have
contemplated would follow its violation. Leonard v. New York,
Buffalo and Albany Telegraph Company, 41 N. Y. 544; Curtin v.
W.estern Uion Telegraph Company, 36 N. Y. Supp. III. This
general rule is well recognized, but in its application to damages in
these cases the courts have found difficulty. While telegraph com-
panies and common carriers are analogous in some respects it is gen-
erally held that the former are not absolute insurers of the proper
transmissions of a message. N. Y. and W. Printing TelegraphCompanty v. Drybnrg, 35 Pa. 398, as to whether their liability is or
is not that of a common carrier it is important to decide. If tele-
graph companies are to be considered as common carriers, their
liability is that of an insurer, and logically, they should be required
to make full indemnity for actual loss sustained. In the case of
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Parkes v. The Alta Cal. Telegraph Company, 13 Cal. 422, decided
about i86o, the defendant was held liable for damages resulting
from the loss of an attachment because of its failure to deliver a
message promptly. The court in this case expressly held the tele-
graph company to be a common carrier. On the other hand, the
case of De Rutte v. The N. Y. and Albany and Buffalo Telegraph
Company, I Daly 547, decided about 1866, held that telegraph com-
panies are not common carriers, but they should be held to a stricter
accountability than mere bailees, and any delay or error should be
prestimed to have been due to their negligence.
In the principal case, the Court of Appeals in an opinion by
Ladd, Judge, says: "If because of unreasonable delay in the accept-
ance, the contract was not completed, then it was for the jury to say
whether the defendant was negligent in transmitting the message,
and owing to this plaintiff lost the benefit of entering into the con-
tract." The inference is, the defendant is liable for the amount
lost in the transaction if the jury finds that it resulted from the neg-
ligence of the defendant company. It is this rule of damages, we
think, as apparently laid down in the opinion that is open to criti-
cism. The tendency of the courts at present seems to limit the lia-
bility of the telegraph company to the cost of the message unless the
message itself may be presumed to fairly appraise the company of its
importance and the damages which might ensue from their failure
to deliver accurately and promptly. For failure to deliver a cipher
message correctly the authorities are almost universal in holding
that nominal damages only may be recovered, because such message
does not appraise the company of its importance, so we think the
rule would be the same in the case of any message which do not
inform the defendant of the nature of the transaction involved.
There are many cases holding this application of the rule of dam-
ages as the correct one. Primrose v. The Western Union Telegraph
Co., 154 U. S. I; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Coggin, 68 Fed.
137; Candee v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 34 Wis. 471; Mer-
rill v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 78 Maine, 97.
With the rule of damages allowing such as may have been rea-
sonably contemplated by the parties from a breach of their contract,
it seems with all deference to the Ohio Court of Appeals, that the
question to be submitted to the jury is, whether or not the tele-
gram sent could be presumed to fairly appraise the company of its
significance and the damage that a non-delivery would cause. A
telegraph company could not reasonably be supposed to render itself
liable for large damages at the ordinary rate of transmission espec-
ially when they have no knowledge of what would be the result of
their failure to deliver. It is conceded that a telegraph company in
all cases may defend their failure to deliver because of an act of
God and may avail themselves of such defenses as common carriers
have. True, there are many cases in accord with the view laid down
by the Ohio courts. But it is plain that this application of the rule
carried to its logical extreme, must necessarily work great injus-
tice to the telegraph companies and render them liable to amounts
far beyond what their rates of transmission would warrant.
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INCREASE OF CAPITAL STOCK OF A CORPORATION-PRIMARY RIGHT OF
AN ORIGINAL STOCKHOLDER TO PURCHASE NEW STOCK.
In the case of Stokes v. Continental Trust Co., decided in the
New York Court of Appeals on November 13 th, i9o6, a question
was decided which will certainly bear much discussion.
In that case, Stokes, the appellant, was the owner of 221 shares
of the original stock of the Trust Company, out of a total of 5,000
shares at par value of $ioo each.
It was not questioned that the company was exceedingly prosper-
ous and that it was unnecessary to issue any more stock except as it
might be for the best interest of the stockholders. Blair & Company,
a firm of private bankers, said to be representing Marshall Field and
others, proposed to the directors of the Trust Company that the
number of shares be increased from the original number of 5,000
shares to io,ooo shares; the capital from $5oo,ooo to $I,OOO,OOO;
and that all the addition-5,ooo shares-be sold to Blair & Company
at $450 per share, with the condition that the buyers be allowed to
name ten of the twenty-one trustees to be chosen at the next meet-
ing. The bonus offered was, therefore, $350 on each share. The
proposition was accepted by the directors and a special meeting duly
warned and called and, by a. vote of 4,197 shares of the original
stock, the deal was put through. Stokes, the appellant, knew the
object of the meeting, attended it and agreed to the increase of
stock-but objected to the sale to Blair & Company. He then
demanded the right to buy as many of the new shares as his holding
of the original shares bore proportion to the whole number. The
directors agreed to take his proposition under consideration and
later the entire new issue was sold to Blair & Company at the agreed
price-$45o per share. At the time of the sale the book value of the
stock was $3o9.69 per share; the market value $55 o , and at the time
of the first trial the price had risen to $7oo per share.
Stokes sued for damages for the failure to deliver the stock
according to his offer-22I shares at $ioo each. The trial court
awarded him the difference between the market value and par value
on the day of the sale, $450 for each share to which he was enti-
tled. The Appellate Division reversed the decision, allowing him
no damages, and the Court of Appeals modified the former holding,
allowing him the difference between the price set by the directors
in the sale to Blair & Company-$45o-and the market value of the
day of the sale which was $55 o , a difference of $IOO per share.
It was decided, with little contention, that the appellant had the
legal right to subscribe for and take the same number of shares of
the new stock that he held of the old, as the new issue corresponded
exactly with the original issue in number of shares. The text-
books and reported cases show a few cases to the contrary, but a
careful reading of these cases show that the holding is correct at
common law-the cases cited involving generally the construction of
statutes. Now comes a rather anomalous holding. From the facts
it appears that the rapid increase in the value of the shares was
directly attributable to the offer of Blair & Company, who were the
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representatives of Marshall Field & Company, and otlii- strong
interests, and that this offer was noised about the financial circles.
Appellant was willing to have the stock increased-though there
was no other reason for the increase than this offer-and, though it
does not clearly so appear, also agreed that if 221 shares were sold
to him (appellant) at par, the balance might be sold to Blair & Com-
pany, or any one else. Judge Vann, in the majority opinion, held
that the company had an undisputed right to place a price of $450
each on the shares and that, even if the appellant had the right which
he claimed to buy the shares, he must pay-not the par value-but
the price set by the company. It is to be regretted that this point
was not gone into more fully. No case sustaining the holding is
cited and a search of the authorities seems to hold the other way.
In a carefully written dissenting opinion, Judge Haight holds, and
with apparent correctness, that the appellant cannot, in the same
breath, consent to an increase of stock in acceptance of Blair & Com-
pany's offer and also demand that he (appellant) be allowed to cut
down the allotment to Blair & Company, thereby reaping the benefit
of an advance admittedly due to the knowledge of the public that
Blair & Company were to acquire the stock and interest their strong
financial backing in appellant's corporation.
The case decides that the offer by Stokes of the par value was
sufficient to bind the corporation to deliver to him the shares-not,
however, at par-but at $45o each, and that no new offer at the
increased price was necessary.
It is rather difficult to see just how this conclusion was arrived
at, except on the principle that the company was absolutely bound
to sell appellant the new shares, and this brings us back to the origi-
nal question of the corporation's right to jump the price from $ioo
to $,45o to appellant, an original stockholder. Of course, to hold
that it was a price fixed independently by the directors is to lose
sight of the fact that it was arbitrarily reckoned in response to the
offer of Blair & Company. The case of Gray v. Portland Bank, 3
Mass. 364, holds, that on a refusal of a corporation to sell to a stock-
holder (original) his proportionate amount of the increase of stock,
the measure of damages is the excess of the market value above par.
This case is generally cited as authority and also seems to hold that
the stockholder's right to subscribe for the increase at par is abso-
lute. No American case, decided on common law principles,
squarely overrules this holding, but it is a well-known fact that, at
the present day, in some jurisdictions by statute and in others in
deference to public opinion, an advance is usually charged to original
stockholders on an increase of such stock. This applies particularly
to public service companies, on the principle that the profits should
accrue to the corporation itself, thus affording opportunity for
improvements to the plant and equipment and a betterment of the
service to the public, rather than be withdrawn from the corporation
directly to the shareholder's private profit. As a matter of law,
however, the decision of this case seems to be an attempt to set up a
new rule based on the bona fides of the participants and the appar-
ent equity of the individual case. The Trial Court, Appellate Divis-
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ion and Court of Appeals all differed in their judgments and in the
conclusions of law leading thereto. Evidently, action by the legis-
lature is necessary to determine just what the law is on this point
in New York state.
RIGHT OF EMPLOYER TO MAKE EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONAL UPON
EMPLOYEE NOT JOINING LABOR ORGANIZATION.
During the last decade there has been much legislation affecting
liberty of contract, such as statutes limiting hours of labor, pre-
scribing conditions of employment, etc. The decisions of the courts
as to the constitutionality of legislation of this nature seem to pre-
sent much confusion and conflict of authority.
In the case of People v. Marcus (N. Y.), 77 N. E. 1073, a pro-
vision of the New York Penal Code making it a misdemeanor for an
employer to coerce or compel employees to enter into an agreement
not to join a labor organization as a condition to securing or retain-
ing employment, was declared unconstitutional by the New York
Court of Appeals, as contrary to the constitutional provisions against
depriving a person of rights and privileges, except "by the law of
the land," or of "life, liberty or property without due process of
law." This decision, in favor of the employer's freedom of con-
tract, is treated as substantially settled by previous holdings that
such contracts are not against public policy, citing National Protec-
tive Asso. v. Cumming, 17o N. Y. 315; and Jacobs v. Cohen, 183
N. Y. 207; and the court declares briefly, that restraints on personal
liberty are limited to those which affect "the safety, health, and
moral or general welfare of the public."
Similar statutes have been declared unconstitutional in other
states on the same ground, and also because violative of the consti-
tutional provision against class legislation; 29 L. R. A. (Mo.)
257; 52 L. R. A. (Ill.) 283; 58 L. R. A. (Wis.) 748; 66 L. R. A.
(Kas.) 185; but in all the cases, including the New York case, the
courts do not discuss at any length the question whether the restraint
does affect the "moral and general welfare of the public," merely
deciding in effect that it does not.
The power of the legislature to determine questions of public
policy is perhaps universally admitted by the courts; and the difli-
culty of ascertaining whether or not there has been a valid exercise
of the police power arises only when such exercise contravenes
some constitutional provision. A review of the authorities on this
point, and as to the exclusive power of the legislature to determine
questions of public policy, seems to establish the following propo-
sitions:
The propriety of the exercise of the police power, within consti-
tutional limits, is purely a matter of legislative discretion, with which
the courts cannot interfere. People v. King, nio N. Y. 418. But
when such statute exceeds constitutional limits, then it is for the
courts to decide whether it has such a reasonable connection with
the public welfare as to appear upon inspection to be adapted to that
end, for it cannot invade the rights of persons and property under
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the guise of the police regulation, when it is not such in fact.
Vieineister v. W~hih'. 179 N. Y. 235.
Legislative powers, the exercise of which can only be justified on
the ground of the police power, and are otherwise unconstitutional,
can be such only as are absolutely required for the safety, comfort or
necessities of the public, and which the framers of the Constitution,
as men of ordinary prudence, cannot be supposed to have intended
to prohibit, despite the language of the prohibition. People %,. Jack-
son, etc., 9 Mich. 285. But it is the province of the court finally
to determine, in case of conflict of the police power and the Consti-
tution, whether there has been a valid exercise of the police power,
and whether the power of the state to legislate, or the right of the
individual to freedom of contract, shall prevail.
W ere this right of review by the courts to be denied, where con-
stitutional guaranties are involved; should the legislature be the sole
judge of what the public welfare meant, they could prescribe what
the people should eat and drink, and what political, moral and reli-
gious creeds they should believe in, all for the public good But this
is not the case, for over the people of the state hangs the shield of
written constitutions, which are the supreme law, which our legis-
lators are sworn to support, which grant a restricted legislative
power, within which the legislators must limit their action for the
public welfare, and whose barriers they cannot overleap under any
pretext of supposed safety of the people; for along with our written
constitutions we have a judiciary, created by them a co-ordinate
department-of the government, whose duty it is, as the appropriate
means of securing to the people safety from legislative oppression,
to annul all legislative action without the pale of those instruments.
This duty of the judicial department, in this country, was demon-
strated by Chief Justice Marshall, in Marbury v. Madison, I Cranch
137, and has since been recognized as settled American law. Beebe
v. The State, 6 Ind. 507-508. In case of conflict, the temporary will
of the people contained in the law, must yield to the paramount will
of the people contained in the Constitution. Beebe v. State, 6 Ind.
527.
STEAMSHIP TICKETS-CONDITIONS LIMITING LIABILITY.
There has been considerable conflict in the New York courts
upon the question of carriers limiting their liability. Cases may be
cited favoring nearly every possible attitude toward this subject.
The case of Tewes v. North German Lloyd Steamship Co.,
reported in 73 N. E. 864, is of interest as tending to fix the New
York rule. Here there was loss of baggage through negligence of
carrier, a steamship company. The ticket of passage contained con-
ditions limiting the company's liability for the loss or injury to or
delay in delivery of baggage to an amount not exceeding $5o.
Nothing was said in rcf,.r-nce to negligence of the carrier. The
passenger did not noticc tbc conditions or have his attention espec-
ially called to them. The court held, that a ticket for an ocean voy-
age is a contract, that the fact that the conditions on the ticket were
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not brought especially to the notice of the passenger would not
relieve him from the enforcement of those conditions by the com-
pany. This view was based on Steers v. Liverpool N. Y. & P. S. S.
Co., 57 N. Y. I. and Wheeler v. Oceanic Steam Nay. Co., 72 Hun. 5.
Johnson, C., in his opinion in the Steers case, says: "Looking to
the course of business the court may take notice that engagement
for voyage across the ocean is a matter of more deliberation and
attention than buying a railroad ticket or taking an express com-
pany's receipt for baggage or for freight." This attitude seems to
be strongly fixed in New York by being practically reiterated in
Wheeler v. Oceanic Steam Nay. Co. and now in Tewes v. North
German Lloyd S.S. Co. The same spirit is evident in the other ques-
tion in the Tewes case, where the divided court held that conditions
in a ticket (granting notice to passengers) were sufficient to limit
carrier's liability to the amount specified even though loss of bag-
gage occurred through ordinary negligence on part of carrier.
Cullen, C. J., and Haight, J., dissenting. The amount to which lia-
bility is limited is construed as an agreed valuation and thereby the
passenger is estopped from recovering full value in case of loss.
Not that the-company is relieved from liability for its negligence,
but that the passenger has, by his acceptance of the ticket, limited
his right to recover. Magnin v. Dinsmore, 75 N. Y. 410. In the
present case Justice Haight dissented, maintaining that such ticket
stipulations only operated to relieve the carrier from its strict com-
mon law liability and not from its obligation to exercise proper care
as a bailee. Rathburne v. N. Y. N. H. & R. Co., i4o N. Y. 48.
The gist of the dissent is well expressed in the words of Gray, J.:
"The rule is firmly established in this state that a common carrier
may contract for immunity from its negligence or that of its agents,
but that to accomplish that object the contract must not be left to
presumption from its language. Considerations based upon public
policy and the nature of the carrier's undertaking influence the appli-
cation of the rule and forbid its operation except where the carrier's
immunity from the consequences of negligence is read in the agree-
ment ipsissimis verbis." Kenny v. N. Y. C. & H. R. Co., 125 N. Y.
422.
The Federal courts and most state courts generally favor pro-
tecting the passenger, who is always more or less at the mercy of the
carrier. R. R. Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357. In two recent cases
decided by Federal courts in New York it was held that a passenger
cannot be held to conditions on a ticket of passage where his atten-
tion had not been called to such conditions and he had no knowl-
edge of them. The Minnetonka, 146 Fed. 509; Weinberger v.
Conzpagnie Generale Atlantique, 146 Fed. 56. The U. S. Supreme
Court does not seem to draw the distinction betweeen.railroad and
steamship tickets. Limited liability stipulations are treated as in the
nature of subterfuges on the part of the carrier and are jealously
scrutinized. Chief Justice Fuller says in The Majestic, 166 U. S.
375, "We quite agree with Lord O'Hagan in Henderson v. Stevens
that when a company desires to impose special and most stringent
terms upon its customers, in exoneration of its own liability there
r98
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is nothing unreasonable in requiring that those terms shall be dis-
tinctly declared and deliberately accepted."
TRANSFER TAX; ASSESSMENT OF SHARES OF STOCK IN A CORPORATION
ORGANIZED UNDER THE LAWS OF TWO STATES.
In appraising the value of shares of stock to ascertain the amount
of tax to be imposed under the New York transfer tax law, an inter-
esting question was presented to the Court of Appeals of that state
in the case of Charles P. Cooley, et al. as executors v. The Comp-
troller, 78 N. E. 939. The law provides for a tax upon the transfer
by will or intestate law of any property or interest therein over a
certain value when the decedent is a non-resident of the state at
the time of his death. In this case the decedent was a resident of
Connecticut. He transferred by will shares of stock in the Boston
and Albany Railroad Company, a consolidated corporation organ-
ized under the laws of both New York and Massachusetts. The
question presented to the court was whether in making the assess-
ment the state of New York should recognize the full value of the
shares held by the decedent, or whether it should limit the tax to a
portion of the total value upon the theory that the company holds its
property in Massachusetts at least under its incorporation in that
state.
It would seem by an examination of former decisions rendered
by the New York courts that a conclusion could be reached without
much difficulty. Though this precise question had not previously
been presented, yet in the late case, it re Palner's Estate, 76 N. E.
13, it was said by Judge Gray that a share of capital stock repre-
sents the distinct interest which its holder has in the corporation.
That his right to participate in the distribution of the net earnings of
the corporation as a going concern or in its assets upon dissolution,
is proportionate to the number of shares which he holds; these evi-
dence the extent of his proprietary interest and their assessment for
taxation purposes must be upon that interest regarded as an entity
and is unapportionable with reference to the situs of the corporate
properties. Adding to this opinion of Judge Gray the fact that a
consolidated corporation organized under two or more states, by
seeking the aid of the laws of New York and being incorporated
thereunder, is considered a domestic corporatioi therein (Matter
of Sage, et al., 70 N. Y. 220), it would seem that the same result
must follow in the assessment of this present tax as where shares
are held in a corporation incorporate alone under the laws of New
York and holding property outside the state. In re Bronson, 150
N. Y. I. The court, however, adopted a contrary doctrine which
seems to be based upon the equitable view that otherwise stock-
holders would be subjected to hardship. Tt is poited out that if
New York levied a tax assessed upon the fuli x'ait of the shares,
the other states of incorporation might do the Same., rv-solting in
double taxation. Such taxation courts should avi-l whenever it is
possible within reason to do so and all presumptions are against its
imposition. Tennessee v. Whitworth, 117 N. S. 129. "The law of
YALE LAW JOURNAL.
taxation is to be construed strictly against the state in favor of the
taxpayer as represented by the executor of the estate. Matter of
Faverweathcr, 143 N. Y. 114."
This is undoubtedly true, but we respectfully submit that the
learned court has seemed to lose sight of the particular law by virtue
of which this assessment is made and the construction of which is
called for by this decision. The history of legislation upon this sub-
ject in New York and elsewhere shows a desire to remedy the fact
that as a general rule the great bulk of personal property escapes
taxation during the life of the owner since, from its very nature it
can be readily concealed. And it was in regard to a message to the
legislature by the chief executive of that state calling for some addi-
tional tax law to remedy this evil that the first of a series of acts
was passed of which the present is the culmination. (Opinion by
Judge Vance in Bronson's Case, 15o N. Y. I). Among other pro-
visions the law now in force provides for the tax of the transfer by
will of property within the state as above stated, the word property
being afterward defined to include "all property or interest therein
whether situated within or without this state." (Laws of 1898,
Chapter 88, Section 242.) Thus plainly intending to make the tax
as sweeping in its results as possible.
Since, therefore, the state has complete power to tax the trans-
fer of stock as property at its true value when such shares are held
in corporations organized under its laws regardless of where their
property is situated (Plummer v. Coler, 178 U. S. 115), it would
seem that such was the plain and undoubted intention of the legisla-
ture in the present instance. And this being the case, the presump-
tion against the possibility of double taxation is rebutted. If such a
construction will operate harshly upon certain individuals the rem-
edy is not with the courts but rather with the legislature for a
change in the enactment.
There is no case to our knowledge which has decided this identi-
cal question. The New York court considers Moody v. Shaw, x73
Mass. 375, and says that the opinion in that case does not seem to
warrant a construction to the effect that such a transfer of shares as
here under consideration would be taxed according to their full
value. There the corporation involved was also the Boston and
Albany Railroad. It is true that this precise point did not arise and
the opinion is very short. But a careful consideration of that case
leads one to draw the inference that in that state the transfer of such
shares of stock for the purpose of taxation, would be assessed as
shares in any domestic corporation regardless of the situation of the
corporate property and incorporation elsewhere.
THE JURISDICTION OF THE. FEDERAL COURTS IN CASES OF CON-
SPIRACY AGAINST PERSONS OF AFRICAN DESCENT.
On October 24, 19 o 6, the Supreme Court of the United States,
filed an opinion in the case of Hodges v. United States, 203 U. S. 1,
which can hardly fail to be of universal interest especially in the
southern sections of the couutry. In that case the court, in an
200
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opinion remarkable for its brevity, held, Harlan and Day, JJ.,
dissenting, that the Federal Courts have no jurisdiction under the
13th Amendment or sections 1978, 1979, 5508, 551o, Revised
Statutes, of a charge of conspiracy made and carried out in a
state to prevent citizens of African decent, because of their race
and color, from making or carrying out contracts and agreements
to labor.
That the Federal Courts had jurisdiction of actions of this class
previous to the threelpost bellum amendments to the Constitution,
can hardly be contended. With the exception of a very few re-
strictions such as the prohibition against expostfacto laws, bills of
attainder, etc., the entire control over the privileges and im-
munities of the citizens was vested exclusively in the state legis-
latures. Carfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. Cir. Ct., 371, 381. The
Federal Government is one of enumerated powers. roth Amend-
ment to the Constitution. The 13 th and x4 th are universally con-
ceded to be restraints on state action and are not intended to
furnish redress for the invasion of individual rights. United
States v. Harris, 19o6 U. S. 313. The state alone has sovereignty
and jurisdiction to protect personal liberty against lawless vio-
lence on the part of individuals. Cooley's Const. Lim. 7o6. Unless,
therefore, the x3 th Amendment gives the Federal Courts juris-
diction over crimes of the character charged in Hodges v. The
United States, it would seem that, of necessity, the remedy must
be sought through the state courts subject to supervision by writs
of error in proper cases. The question then resolves itself into a
determination of the scope of the 13 th Amendment.
The national government has power, whether expressly given
or not, to secure and protect rights conferred or guaranteed by
the Constitution. United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214. Every
right created by, arising under, or dependent upon, the Constitu-
tion of the United States may be protected and enforced by Con-
gress in such manner as Congress may, is its discretion, deem
best adapted to the objects sought. Logan v. United States, 144 U.
S. 293. Can it be correctly said, however, that a conspiracy to
prevent citizens of African decent, because of their race and color,
from making or carrying out contracts and agreements to labor is
the deprivation of a right created by, or dependent upon, the x3 th
Amendment? Or in other words does such a conspiracy in its
effect virtually amount to slavery and involuntary servitude?
The solution of this question appears to be the point of dissension
among the judges in this case.
Pomeroy in his work on Municipal Law, 66o p. 383, defines
slavery as a status implying perpetual servitude to the master or
owner upon whom it confers the complete contrl1 and dominion
over the labor, acquisitions and person of the slave. Whether
this definition is sufficiently comprehensive or not, we do not at-
tempt to say. At any rate, it is sufficient for rurpurpose. While
the inciting cause of the 13 th Amendment was the emancipa-
tion of the colored race, yet it was not an attempt to commit that
race to the care of the nation. It reaches every race and equally
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forbids Mexican peonage and the Chinese coolie trade when they
amount to involtary servitude. Slaughterhouse Case, 16 Wall. 36.
It must be borne in mind, however, that Congress did not assume
under theauthority given by the x3 th Amendment to adjust what
may be called the social rights of men in the community; but only
to declare and vindicate those fundamental rights which appertain
to the essence of citizenship and the enjoyment or deprivation of
which constitute the essential distinction between freedom and
slavery. CivilRighis Cases, 109 U. S. 22.
The rights of citizens to pursue and follow any of the ordinary
vocations of life are not created by the Constitution, but are
among the inherent and inalienable rights of men. Butcher's
Union v. Crescent City CO., I I I U. S. 757 ; Civil Right Cases, 1o9 U.
S. 3, 13. In the case of Logan v. United States, 144 U. S. 203, 293
the court held that the right to work at a givn occupation, or part-
icular calling, free from injury or interference by individual citizers
was not a right guaranteed by the Censtitution. Where a state
has been guilty of n1o violaion of thte i 3 th, i 4 th or i 5 th Amend-
ment no power is conferred on Congress to punish priva.e indi-
viduals who, acting without any authority from the state, and it
may be defiance of law, invade the rights of the citizen protected
by such amendmens. Le Grand v. United States, 12 Fed. 577.
Unless the state denies -o person:" of the colored race tie equal
protection of the laws, (ongress has no power to pasi laws for
the punishment of or.inary crimes and offences against them.
United Statesv. Cruikshank et al., x Wood 308.
We fail to see therefore, how under circumstances such as
these where the state has been guilty of no unjust discrimination
against her colored citizens, but on the contrary is ready and
wiliing to enforce the l:iw and protect them in the exercise of
their fundamental rights as citizens, the Fedecal Courts have any
right to assume jurisdiction simply because the persons wronged
happen to be of the African race. To hold otherwise would be
in fact granting them privileges not secured to the white citizens
who gave them their freedom and to invest the Federal Courts
with jurisdiction over practically the whole category of crimes
when the victim happened to be a negro. Such a result was
clearly not intended by the adoption of the 13th Amendment of
the Constitution.
